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Summary:  
 
A dominant trend in the literature maintains that donor assistance should be targeted to poor 
countries with sound institutions and policies. In this context, donor selectivity refers to what 
extent aid is allocated according to the principles of this "canonical" model. This paper shows 
that it is legitimate for donors to simultaneously use other selectivity criteria corresponding 
either to expected factors of aid effectiveness or to handicaps to development. It is notably 
argued that vulnerability to exogenous shocks and low level of human capital should be 
considered as selectivity criteria. Taking these other criteria into account dramatically changes 
the assessment of donor selectivity.  
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CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.16 
 3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Not all countries have the same capacity to effectively use external assistance to promote their 
development. With the decline in international aid during the 1990s, the issue of aid allocation 
and its effectiveness naturally came into the spotlight. This gave rise to the concept of "aid 
selectivity", which refers to the quality of aid allocation, the most selective aid being that 
which maximises the effectiveness with regard to the set objectives. Although the 
international community has since made the commitment to significantly increase the volume 
of development aid, the issue of selectivity remains high on the agenda. 
 
We here consider the selectivity of aid as a general concept designing a geographical pattern 
of aid allocation that maximizes a legitimate objective, primarily poverty reduction. However, 
according to a current meaning, aid selectivity is also used as a narrower concept, designing 
an allocation of aid that gives preference to countries with good policies and institutions. This 
last definition is issued from the assertion of Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000a) that aid 
stimulates growth, then leads to poverty reduction, only in countries with sound policies. As 
we consider that aid purpose is not exclusively economic growth and that aid effectiveness 
depends on a broader range of country characteristics, the concept of selectivity 
corresponding to allocating aid on the basis of this range of characteristics is more general 
than that outlined in such studies as Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) or Dollar and Levin 
(2004) , but not inconsistent with it. 
 
Since aid selectivity is here defined as the quality of its geographical allocation, assessing 
selectivity implies comparing actual allocation to what would be an optimal one. Aid 
allocation studies are not new, coming back to the 1960s (Little and Clifford, 1965; Bhagwati, 
1972; Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976). White and McGillivray (1995) and McGillivray 
(2004a) propose to divide these studies in three groups. The first one attempts to explain the 
observed allocation of aid. It is applied either to total aid or to aid from each source. It can be 
noted that some studies among this first group, in particular the more recent ones, have 
become to some degree normative as they seek to identify, from among the explanatory 
factors of allocation, those which represented the recipient countries’ needs, as opposed to the 
donor countries’ interests: "good allocation" is then deemed to be that which takes into 
account the recipient countries’ needs (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthélémy and Tichit, 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.16 
 4 
2004; Berthélémy, 2004; Canavire et al., 2005). The second group describes and evaluates the 
observed allocation against normative criteria and tries to measure “donor performance” with 
respect to geographical aid allocation. It is the selectivity issue. As soon as 1989 McGillivray 
proposed and calculated a performance index, which has been revised and extended further. 
This index was focused on the recipient country level of development.  Still in this group and 
more recently, Dollar and Levin (2004) and Roodman (2004) have sought to establish 
selectivity indicators by examining to what extent aid is allocated to countries where it is 
likely to be the most effective. These works refer primarily to Burnside and Dollar paradigm, 
which makes aid effectiveness to depend upon good policies. Finally a third group of studies 
seeks to prescribe an inter-recipient allocation of aid by calculating the amount of aid each 
country should receive based on normative criteria (McGillivray and White, 1994; Collier and 
Dollar, 2001, 2002; Llavador and Romer, 2001; Cogneau and Naudet, 2004; McGillivray, 
2004a). While the second group of studies analyses each donor aid allocation in order to 
obtain a ranking of donors, the third group mainly considers the total amount of aid to be 
received by each country1. 
   
 The present paper, which belongs to the second group of studies, considers how to assess the 
quality of geographical aid allocation, then to measure through appropriate indicators the 
selectivity of donors. Starting from Dollar and Levin  and Roodman’s approaches, it proposes 
an alternative method of assessment. One reason for this choice is that the World Bank and 
the IMF in their Global Monitoring Report (2004 and 2005) make unquestioning reference to 
Dollar and Levin’s study, which tends to give it some political credence that could well 
impact donor behaviour. The main message of these works on selectivity indicators is that 
selectivity is to be assessed only from the level of income (or poverty) and the quality of 
policy (governance) of recipient countries. It is consistent with the studies of the third group 
such as those of Collier and Dollar which determine optimal aid allocation from the same 
variables. We argue that these analyses of selectivity indicators raise significant 
methodological problems, which heavily influence the assessment of aid selectivity for both 
bilateral and multilateral donors. We consider as legitimate for donors to simultaneously use 
other selectivity criteria, corresponding either to expected factors of aid effectiveness, in order 
to make aid more efficient, or to handicaps to development, in order to make aid more 
equitable. Vulnerability to exogeneous shocks and low level of human capital should be 
                                                          
1
 McGillivray (2004a) also applied his model to Swedish aid. Unpublished simulations of the Collier-Dollar 
model were made for specific donors aid. 
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considered as selectivity criteria. Taking these other criteria into account dramatically changes 
the assessment of donor selectivity. This is evidenced through several methods of assessment 
of aid selectivity. 
  
After stating those principles which, in our opinion, should form the basis of any 
measurement of the aid selectivity, and thereby clarifying the limits met by the recent 
analyses on selectivity, we show how donor ranking can be reversed according to the criteria 
used to assess aid selectivity. We use successively two methods of assessment, one referred to 
as the elasticity approach, the other as the recipient average profile approach. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines some principles for the assessment of 
aid selectivity, while the next three sections investigate three different ways of measuring it: 
selectivity measured according to a dichotomic criterion (section 3), selectivity measured by 
elasticities from an aid allocation model (section 4) and selectivity measured by an average 
profile of recipient countries (section 5). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. SOME PRINCIPLES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF AID SELECTIVITY. 
 
The comparative analysis of each donor’s selectivity initiated by McGillivray (1989, 1992), 
used the recipient countries’ per capita income as the single criterion of selectivity. An 
additional stage was reached by Dollar and Levin (2004) and Roodman (2004), who diversify 
the criteria. Dollar and Levin run a descriptive model of aid allocation (for each donor on 
annual data from 1999 to 2002, and then on a five-year average) including explanatory 
variables corresponding only to the so-called "good criteria": the level of GDP per capita 
(negative coefficient expected) and the economic policy, measured by the World Bank 
indicator Country Policy and Institutional Assessment or CPIA (positive coefficient 
expected). The control variable is the population size. The per capita income elasticity of aid 
is intended to represent the sensitivity of each donor to the level of poverty, and the CPIA 
elasticity of aid its response to the quality of the receiving country’s economic policy. The 
simple average of these two elasticities (after having reversed the sign of the income elasticity 
which is normally negative) is taken as the indicator of each donor’s aid selectivity.  
 
The indicator proposed by Roodman (more directly inspired by the work of McGillivray) 
differs from Dollar and Levin’s in that it is not based on the econometric estimation of 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.16 
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functions of aid allocation. Each donor’s performance indicator corresponds to its aid volume 
adjusted to take into account the "quality" of aid, particularly its selectivity (the volume of aid 
is lowered according to the “bad” quality of allocation). The adjustment of aid value with 
regard to the selectivity does not apply to emergency aid, the granting of which increases the 
performance of the donors whatever its destination. The aid selectivity depends both on the  
recipient country’s per capita income and on an indicator of its governance designed by 
Kaufmann and Kraay.2 The adjustments for project aid and programme support are different, 
because David Roodman considers, following Radelet (2004), that project aid is more 
effective than programme support in countries with poor governance. The linear weights 
applied to the level of the per capita income and to the level of governance are multiplicative, 
so that the aid granted to a rich, well-governed country is equal to zero, as is the programme 
aid granted to a poor, badly-governed country. From the adjustment of the actual value of aid 
according to its quality, two indicators are provided for each donor for 2002: the value of the 
donor’s adjusted aid in proportion to its GDP, and the rate of aid quality or aid selectivity (i.e. 
the ratio of the adjusted aid to the aid value before adjustment). 
 
The analysis of the principles, on which these measures of selectivity are based, makes it 
possible to underline their main limits.  
 
a. Selectivity is only one aspect of aid quality 
 
Evaluating the selectivity of each donor’s development assistance does not mean measuring 
its overall aid quality, but only one aspect—the quality of geographical allocation, insofar as 
it affects aid effectiveness. The modalities of the assistance given to each country are 
obviously also a factor of effectiveness. Thus Roodman (2004), in order to provide an 
indicator of the aid quality, adjusts its value not only according to the allocation (the 
selectivity by itself), but also according to its degree of tying and its fragmentation into many 
purposes. 
 
Moreover, optimal allocation of aid is undoubtedly not independent of its purpose (project, 
programme, technical assistance, emergency), the conditionality attached, and the type of 
                                                          
2
 Kaufmann and Kraay’s indicator is an aggregate including six dimensions: voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. They are measured by a 
hundred variables from 24 different sources (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003). 
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 7 
financing (grants or loans). This means that aid effectiveness does not depend only on the 
behaviour of the recipient countries, but also on the donors’ behaviour. Whilst Roodman takes 
into account several modalities of assistance to assess donor selectivity (which is somewhat 
debatable), Dollar and Levin address the issue of selectivity independently of the modalities 
used, which constitutes a first limit of their measurement of selectivity.  
 
b. Selectivity is related to the objectives of aid   
 
Selectivity is basically a relative concept, as it signifies the optimal allocation of aid with 
regard to its effectiveness, which is necessarily contingent to its objectives. These objectives 
can logically differ from one donor to another. The usual objective is economic growth. 
However, since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)3, the aid 
objectives pursued by the international community have become multidimensional, since 
poverty reduction does not depend exclusively on economic growth. Taking the MDGs into 
account may lead to consider that, with regard to equity, more aid should be allocated to 
countries which are more remote from the goals4. 
 
Over and above the Millennium Development Goals, foreign aid can target other objectives in 
terms of which effectiveness should be assessed. These may include the promotion of 
democracy or the respect of human rights, neither of which have a clear link with growth and 
poverty reduction. Aid can also be used to finance global public goods, which generate 
positive externalities to non-recipient countries (e.g. control of pollution or communicable 
diseases), or it can finance post-conflict countries and help them to avoid the resumption of 
conflict and to rebuild their economies. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also show that aid 
promotes growth in post-conflict countries more than elsewhere. Finally, some countries, 
particularly France, assign specific goals to their aid policy, such as supporting former 
colonies or countries that share their language. These goals can be considered as legitimate 
insofar as they express specific solidarity or responsibility. They can also be justified with 
respect to the criterion of aid effectiveness to promote development. Certainly, the ties created 
by a colonial past or a common language, facilitate understanding between partners when aid 
                                                          
3
 Adopted in 2000 by the United Nations General Assembly, the eight MDGs are the following: eradicate 
extreme poverty and hungry, achieve universal primary education,, promote gender equality and empower 
women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure 
environmental sustainability, develop global partnership for development. 
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involves a dialogue on the actions implemented and a transfer of knowledge, which is often 
the case.  
 
It is difficult for analyses of aid selectivity to take into account the diversity of the donors’ 
goals. They thus focus on poverty reduction resulting uniquely from the effect of aid on 
economic growth. This constitutes a second limitation of such analyses. 
 
c. Selectivity depends on various recipient country characteristics which condition aid 
effectiveness.  
 
Recent studies on selectivity ranking( Dollar and Levin, 2004; Roodman, 2004) are based 
essentially on Burnside and Dollar’s thesis (1997, 2000a and b) on the relationship between 
aid and economic growth (used as a basis for the 1998 World Bank report, Assessing Aid), 
and fail to take into account the academic community’s extensive critical studies that followed 
Burnside and Dollar’s work5. Leaving aside the criticisms of the robustness of the 
econometric results and those concerning the choice of economic growth as the sole objective 
of aid (mentioned above), let us briefly examine the basic questions of the model’s relevance 
and main assumptions. 
 
The assumption — presented as self-evident, yet not developed in detail — according to 
which aid effectiveness depends on economic policy and/or institutions, has been discussed 
less in its principle than because of the definition given of “good policy or institutions”. In the 
first version of their work (1997). Burnside and Dollar created a policy index based on several 
variables used in the empirical growth literature (inflation rate, budget balance, and the 
openness index of Sachs and Warner). In a follow-up paper (2000b) they added a rule of law 
measure to the index. In a new version of their work (2004a), they use the indicator of 
governance of Kaufmann and Kraay more related to the quality of institutions  than to 
economic policy. Remind that Roodman uses this last indicator, while Dollar and Levin) (as 
done by Collier and Dollar, 2001, 2002)  use the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment   
or CPIA indicator) designed and used by the World Bank to determine the amount of its 
commitments per country. The CPIA itself includes twenty indicators and is at once related to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4
 In a same perspective Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher (2006) examine the allocation of global and sectoral aid 
with regard to each of the Millenium Development Goals and their specific targets.  
5
 Cf. Amprou and Chauvet (2004) for a survey on these criticisms and their consequences for aid selectivity. 
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economic policy, institutions and governance. Nonetheless, this indicator poses two problems: 
(i) it is based on an assessment of country policies and institutions by World Bank staff only 
and (ii) it is not available outside the Bank and cannot be used by either academics or other 
donors for their own aid allocation purposes. Finally, its use supposes that, in all the countries, 
whatever their specificities and preferences, it is the same kind of economic policy (defined as 
good) which promotes growth and increases aid effectiveness. This assumption has been 
strongly criticised notably by Kanbur (2004), McGillivray (2004b) and Michaïlof (2004).     
 
More important, however, is to acknowledge that aid effectiveness in terms of growth does 
not depend only (and perhaps not even mainly) on the recipient’s economic policy. Other 
factors, which have been econometrically tested, intervene. The importance of economic 
vulnerability, for instance, has been identified (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), i.e. shocks 
to which many developing countries are particularly exposed, either through their foreign 
trade, notably because of the variations in the international prices of primary commodities, or 
due to climatic incidents or natural disasters. These factors both have a negative impact on 
growth and increase aid effectiveness. Indeed, in the countries facing shocks, aid can avoid 
shortfalls in imports and the slowdown of growth, as well as the cumulative decline that often 
ensues. The higher the amount of aid, the more it relatively dampens the macroeconomic 
impact of shocks; that is to say, aid is marginally more effective in more vulnerable countries 
or, in other words, aid decreases the negative impact of the vulnerability.  
 
The analysis of the ways in which aid effectiveness is influenced by the recipient country’s 
vulnerability and by factors other than economic policy has been developed in several 
directions.  Studies have highlighted the specific effect of aid provided at a time of negative 
terms-of-trade shocks (Collier and Dehn, 2001) or in post-conflict situations (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). Following on from their earlier studies, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) 
highlight how several factors simultaneously influence aid effectiveness. Their findings 
indicate that economic vulnerability (measured, this time, simply through the instability of 
exports and the terms-of-trade trend) increases aid effectiveness. Political instability, on the 
other hand, decreases effectiveness, unless such instability occurs in neighbouring countries, 
in which case, effectiveness is increased. The quality of infrastructure and education also 
brings about an increase. As for the level of human capital, however, other authors have 
recently supported the view that aid effectiveness is marginally higher in countries where this 
level is lower (Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey, 2004).  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.16 
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Regarding economic policy, the critique of the current view does not only concern the 
robustness of the econometric results or the indicator selected, it also concerns the assumption 
that donors cannot influence recipients’ economic policies. Case studies, published in the 
book Aid and Reform in Africa (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001) and carried out on 
the initiative of the World Bank, reveal that, in many instances, aid had indeed influenced the 
countries’ economic policy. If such is the case, aid has a role to play in those countries where 
there is a particular need to improve economic policy. Thus, in the above-mentioned study by 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, aid effectiveness appears much more effective if the present policy 
is “good” and the former policy was bad and thus perfectible. 
 
The fact that the analyses of selectivity retain only good economic policy or good governance 
as a factor of aid effectiveness is thus the third limitation of these studies.6 
 
d. Selectivity is meaningful only for discretionary aid 
 
A difficult question is to determine which concept of aid is the most appropriate for assessing 
selectivity. The authors who have assessed aid selectivity have preferred to use the Official 
Development Assistance disbursements rather than the commitments, whereas a priori the 
latter represent the donors’ intentions better than the disbursements (Dudley and 
Montmarquette, 1976), and more accurately reflect actual policy. The reason advanced for 
this is that, if commitments are durably higher than disbursements, this expresses a "tendency 
of certain donors to promise more than they can realistically deliver, or a failure to learn from 
history that certain recipients cannot absorb aid as fast as donors hope " (Roodman 2004, p.5).  
 
Another point of discussion is whether the gross or net flows of aid should be considered. 
Whereas Dollar and Levin refer to the gross disbursements, Roodman chooses the net 
transfers, i.e. he deducts the whole debt service (principal and interests) from gross aid, 
because net transfers are a better measurement of the cost for the donors and the benefit for 
the receivers. Roodman’s choice is related to his objective: to establish an indicator of donor 
performance taking account of both aid volume and aid quality. The question of whether to 
                                                          
6
 This point is emphasized in McGillivray (2003a, 2003b), who proposes different criteria for aid selectivity: 
political stability, democracy, post-conflict reconstruction and economic reconstruction.   
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use gross or net aid is related to the treatment of debt cancellations. Should one exclude from 
aid flows the share attributable to the debt cancellations, as these relate to loans granted 
beforehand and generally result from decisions taken on the international scene? Given the 
importance of debt cancellations in development aid, their inclusion involves a risk of strong 
bias in assessing the aid allocation of each donor. However, this bias is less significant if one 
considers the gross rather than the net flow of aid, as in Dollar and Levin’s paper, since, 
unlike net flows, gross flows are affected only by the cancellation of commercial debts.7 
 
A final question is whether development aid only should be considered, or if emergency aid 
should also be included (as Roodman does, unlike Dollar and Levin), since the latter should 
not be dissociated from development goals. However, the reasons for offering emergency aid 
are different from those for development aid and its allocation depends on specific, even 
random, events such as natural disasters or wars.8 
 
In short, the current analyses of aid selectivity come up against three main limitations: the 
focus on a single objective for aid, the assumption that aid effectiveness with regard to 
economic growth depends exclusively or mainly on economic policy and institutions, and the 
measurement of aid which poorly reflects the discretionary choices of the donors.  
 
In what follows, we will try to push back these limitations of the current studies on selectivity. 
We will show that the assessment of the various donors’ aid selectivity, such as it was put 
forward by the Global Monitoring Report (2004), is largely modified when we take into 
account the different factors affecting aid effectiveness, and to a lesser extent when we 
consider that donors can legitimately have other goals than to maximize economic growth or 
even poverty reduction. In order to better focus on "discretionary" aid, we use, as do Dollar 
and Levin, gross disbursements rather than net transfers, considering that the former better 
represent the choices of aid allocation. For the same reason, but unlike these authors, we 
deduct the disbursements corresponding to debt cancellation, and, like them, we deduct  
 
                                                          
7
 According to DAC guidelines, a cancellation of concessional debt (corresponding to an initial loan which had 
been included in ODA when it was disbursed) is not included in gross ODA, except for the present value of the 
interest payment reduction that this cancellation produces. However, the cancellation of a commercial debt is 
added to gross ODA, since the cancellation takes the form of an automatic repayment of its reimbursements to 
the debtor country. 
8In 2003 for instance debt cancellation plus emergency aid represented 40% of ODA gross disbursements to  
Sub-Saharan Africa. (Source OECD)  
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 emergency assistance from ODA (the Development Aid Committee’s aggregate).9  
 
Three categories of selectivity measurement are successively presented for the year 2003, the 
last year for which data were available. The first, directly echoing the Global Monitoring 
Report (2004), uses only one criterion. The second, following Dollar and Levin, uses aid 
elasticities to the "virtuous" determinants of aid allocation. The third type of measurement, 
starting from Roodman’s analysis, calculates an average profile of the recipients by donor. 
This third measurement makes it possible to introduce certain country-specific aid criteria.  
 
3. SELECTIVITY WITH REGARD TO ONLY ONE CRITERION: A DICHOTOMIC 
APPROACH.  
 
Let us start quite simply by taking the graph in which the Global Monitoring Report 2004 
(Chapter "Providing more and better aid"), summarises its analysis of the level and quality of 
the aid of the various bilateral donors. We then compare this with an alternate graph that is 
based on the distinction between the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the other 
developing countries (Guillaumont, 2004). 
 
a. Selectivity based exclusively on the CPIA  
 
 As on some roman churches’ tympana depicting the Last Judgement, the Global Monitoring 
Report 2004 divides aid-recipient countries into two equally-sized groups, on the sole basis of 
the CPIA: those with “good” policies and those with “bad” policies (or institutions). The 
graph locates each donor according to the volume of aid (per capita of the donor country) 
granted to both categories of recipients, represented along the axes (cf. Graph 1). The donors 
located below the bisectrix are indicated as having a low aid selectivity and conversely. It is 
the angle with respect to the horizontal axis that indicates the degree of selectivity, and not the 
distance from the diagonal, as an over-hasty reading of the graph might suggest. The further 
the donors are located from the origin, due to the significant volume of aid allocated, the more 
they visually deviate from the diagonal (e.g. France, who thus appears in a rather unenviable 
position…).  
 
                                                          
9
 DAC’s ODA statistics include emergency assistance. 
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The position of the donors above or below the diagonal clearly depends on the cursor chosen 
to classify the recipient countries as either "good" or "bad". Here, the cursor is the median of 
the CPIA, which does not allow for a high degree of differentiation since a good number of 
countries are grouped around this median.10 Although the Global Monitoring Report 2004 
acknowledges that it is normal to take into account shocks and post-conflict situations in aid 
allocation, only the quality of the economic policy measured by the CPIA is visualised in the 
Graph 1. Far from emphasising the limits and relativity of Dollar and Levin’s method, the 
authors of the Global Monitoring Report present the conclusions of the analysis (which they 
use as their starting point) in a simplified form with no apparent reserves.11 
 
b. Selectivity based on the category of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)  
 
In order to illustrate the particular vision of aid selectivity given by the above graph, we 
replaced the CPIA median by the criterion of membership or not of the category of the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), officially defined by the United Nations to identify among the 
low income countries those suffering the most from structural handicaps to growth (cf. Graph 
2). The choice of this criterion can be easily justified. The developed countries are committed 
to a target of 0.15% of their GNP as overseas development assistance (ODA) to this category 
of countries. The membership of developing countries to this category is governed by three 
criteria (United Nations, 2000): they have (i) a low level of income per capita, (ii) a low level 
of human capital and (iii) a high level of economic vulnerability. The level of human capital 
(Human Assets Index: HAI) is measured by two health indicators (child survival at age five 
and calorie intake per capita expressed as a percentage of the needs, recently replaced by the 
percentage of population undernourished) and two education indicators (adult literacy rate and 
secondary enrolment ratio). Economic vulnerability (Economic Vulnerability Index: EVI) is 
measured by several indicators, which have been recently refined: four indicators representing 
exposure to shocks (small population size, expressed in logarithms, remoteness from main 
world markets, the share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GDP, and concentration of 
goods exports), and three indicators representing the size of the shocks (instability of  goods 
and services exports, instability of agricultural production, percentage of the population 
displaced by natural disasters).  
                                                          
10
 Berg (2003, p.22) already pointed out this limit for Collier and Dollar’s study. 
11
 The use of Dollar and Levin’s work by the Global Monitoring Report 2005 is less caricatural, since the 
recipient countries are classified according to their CPIA in three (instead of two) groups, so that Graph 1 is 
replaced by a diagram. However the tonality remains the same. 
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Each of these three criteria stands as a reason to support LDC’s through aid allocation. There 
are two reasons for allocating aid according to a country’s economic vulnerability. First, as 
seen above, structural vulnerability reinforces aid effectiveness and, second, it constitutes a 
structural handicap to growth that should be offset. The first reason is a principle of 
effectiveness and the second a principle of equity. The low level of human capital is also a 
handicap to growth, but probably not, at least in the immediate future, a factor of aid 
effectiveness. On the other hand, in the long run, the actions to promote human capital most 
probably help to increase the absorptive capacity of aid and thus its effectiveness. The 
criterion of human capital is perfectly consistent with the Millennium Development Goals, as 
is the income per capita criterion, which reflects the extent of poverty.  
 
c. Comparison of the two criteria  
 
If the position of the most virtuous donors (Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden) is barely modified, it is not the same for the countries closer to the diagonal: thus 
Japan passes below the diagonal, whereas France moves above it. The change is most evident 
for the case of France, reflecting the fact that, compared to other donors, France gives more 
weight in aid allocation to growth handicaps than to economic policy or governance, at least 
as it is expressed in the CPIA.  
 
4. SELECTIVITY MEASURED BY AID ELASTICITIES FROM A MODEL OF 
GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION  
 
Here we follow the method used by Dollar and Levin, and we analyse the consequences of 
using different criteria to measure multilateral and bilateral donors’ selectivity. It is 
unfortunately impossible to reproduce Dollar and Levin’s results, since the CPIA remains 
confidential, although it is used in an official World Bank and IMF report to assess donors’ 
behaviour. Hence, we take Kaufmann and Kraay’s governance index (also used by Roodman)  
instead of the CPIA. 
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a. Estimating four alternative functions of aid allocation   
 
For each donor, we considered aid per capita allocated in 200312 to developing countries as a 
function of their per capita GDP and alternatively of three other variables, namely Kaufmann 
and Kraay’s indicator of governance (KKI), the revised economic vulnerability index (EVI) 
and the human assets index (HAI). The last two indices are calculated by the United Nations’ 
Committee for Development Policy (CDP) in order to identify the LDCs13. All the variables 
are expressed in logarithms so as to obtain elasticities14. The use of the indicator of 
governance (KKI) makes it possible to establish an index of selectivity in the Dollar-Levin 
fashion, which we named "focused on governance". The use of the second indicator (EVI) is 
consistent with the work of Guillaumont and Chauvet and leads to a selectivity index "focused 
on vulnerability". The use of the third indicator (HAI) refers more directly to the Millennium 
Development Goals. Each index of selectivity is the simple average of aid elasticities 
(expressed according to the expected sign)15 with regard to the per capita GDP and to the 
second indicator selected, as done by Dollar and Levin for the two elasticities they estimated 
(with regard to the per capita GDP and the CPIA). In order to obtain a composite indicator of 
selectivity, we then simultaneously estimated the elasticities with regard to the four variables 
(GDP per capita, EVI, HAI, KKI). This method raises some technical difficulties 
(Guillaumont, 2004b and Roodman, 2004), that we acknowledge.16 Nonetheless, we have 
kept to Dollar and Levin’s method, since our objective is to compare our results with theirs.  
 
                                                          
12
 Last year available in terms of statistics. 
13
 We here use the EVI as revised by the CDP in March 2005 and calculated from data as available for the last 
review of the list of LDCs in 2003.   
14
 The dependent variable is per capita aid (for each recipient country) instead of global aid. We do not introduce 
the population size into the explanatory variables, since it is one of the components of the EVI index (a small 
population is considered as a factor of greater vulnerability to external shocks). This approach ends up imposing 
a unitary elasticity of aid to population. 
15
 For good selectivity, we expect a negative coefficient for the per capita income and the human assets index 
(HAI) and a positive coefficient for the governance indicator and the vulnerability indicator (EVI). To compute 
the average of elasticities, the sign of the first two elasticities has been reversed.    
16
  (i) When a country receives no aid from a donor, it is not possible to keep a zero, since log of zero tends to 
infinite. In this case, Dollar and Levin replace the zero by a low value of aid ($10.000). This arbitrary choice has 
an influence on the value of elasticities. A better solution would have been to estimate a Tobit model as done by 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) and Canavire et al. (2005). (ii) Another difficulty comes from the elasticities that 
are often not significantly different from zero. Even though the estimated value of elasticities is not a priori more 
open to critique than a zero value, this casts some doubts on the validity of the method or at least on the 
signification of the differences in the ranking. (iii) White and McGillivray (1995) contested the use of the 
coefficients of a regression of aid on economic characteristics, as an indicator of aid allocation performance, as 
far as these coefficients are influenced by the total amount of aid. However this criticism here does not apply 
since  all the variables are expressed in logarithm so as to have the coefficients measuring elasticities, with a 
constant included besides the explanatory variables and capturing the size effect.  
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b. A radically changed ranking of donors  
 
It appears clearly that donor ranking changes dramatically from one indicator to the other in 
Table 1, which gives the results for each donor and in Table 2, which presents a synthetic 
view of the differences in ranking. First of all, let us compare Dollar and Levin’s ranking with 
those which take into account the two growth handicaps, resulting from vulnerability to 
external shocks or from weak human capital. The various United Nations agencies, as do 
bilateral donors such as Portugal, France and, to a lesser degree, Ireland, Spain and Italy—
which are among the least selective donors in the canonical meaning—go up appreciably in 
the ranking based on the level of the human capital (HAI). The same change appears again for 
Portugal and United Nations agencies, as well as for Greece and the Development Banks, 
with the ranking based on vulnerability.  
 
If we now consider the ranking established with the composite or global selectivity index, the 
inversion of ranking is particularly striking for the United Nations agencies, which gain 27 to 
5 ranks and for Portugal which ranked 31st out of 42 donors by Dollar and Levin and  
becomes 6th and first of the bilateral donors, whereas France gains only two ranks (30th 
instead of 32nd out of 42). On the contrary, the United Kingdom goes down sharply (minus 35 
ranks), as do Austria (minus 30 ranks) and Sweden (minus 28 ranks), due to little weight these 
countries give to the recipients’ level of human capital and vulnerability in their aid 
allocation. This is also the case, but to a lesser extent, for Norway, Finland, Denmark and the 
United States. On the other hand, IDA as well as the IMF maintain a very good ranking.   
 
Moreover, we note that the two criteria intended to represent the recipient countries’ "good 
behaviour" (the CPIA and the Kaufmann and Kraay’s indicator of governance) give differing 
results for several countries. This is particularly the case of United Nations agencies and 
Development Banks, as well as Australia, Japan and the United States, whose ranking 
significantly improves when one refers to the second indicator. The losers are mainly Austria, 
Belgium, Sweden, Portugal and the United Kingdom. This comparison reinforces the feeling 
that the assessments related to policy and governance are relatively subjective and 
consequently sensitive.        
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5. SELECTIVITY MEASURED FROM AN AVERAGE PROFILE OF RECIPIENT 
COUNTRIES   
 
The advantage of the second method now used is to not rely on an econometric estimation 
(prone to criticism) of the determinants of each donor’s aid allocation. This method 
approaches the one used by McGillivray and Roodman. However, unlike them, we do not 
calculate a value of aid adjusted by the quality of the allocation. We are directly interested in 
aid selectivity. We calculate, therefore, an "average profile" of the aid recipients of each 
donor, weighted by the proportion of its aid allocated to each country. This average profile 
can be calculated from as many receiver’s characteristics as one wishes. This method offers 
one significant advantage compared to the selectivity approach: each selectivity criterion 
indicator included in the average profile is independent from the other criteria, while the 
elasticity approach measures partial elasticities which depend on the level of the other 
variables. It avoids to take into account one indicator only to the extent it is not correlated 
with the others.      
  
a. An average profile of aid recipients of each donor according to four criteria  
 
We here keep the four indicators mentioned in the previous section and used to measure 
selectivity by elasticities, namely the level of income (GDP per capita), the quality of the 
governance (Kaufmann and Kraay’s index), the vulnerability (EVI) and the level of human 
capital (HAI). For each donor i, we calculate an average per capita GDP* of its aid receivers, 
weighted by the share of its aid to each recipient country j in its total assistance, as well as an 
average HAI*, an average EVI* and an average KKI*, weighted in the same manner 
wij = Aij / Aj  
 
GDP*i =  wij . GDPj  
 
HAI*i =  wij . HAIj  
 
EVI*i =  wij . EVIj  
 
  KKI*i =  wij . KKIj  
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To give an equal weight to each component, GDP, EVI, HAI and KKI are calibrated on a 0 to 
100 scale. Furthermore, we reversed GDP and HAI, in order to have the four components 
evolve in the same direction. The average profile of each donor’s recipients is then given by 
the sum of these four components. This gives an indicator of aid selectivity and makes it 
possible to rank the donors. 
 
                                                      Ii =  (GDP*i , HAI*i ,  EVI*i ,  KKI*i )  
 
 
so that a higher index I for donor i means that, compared to the other donors, donor i allocates 
its aid to countries either poorer, or more vulnerable, or with a better governance, or with a 
lower human capital, or a combination of these four characteristics. It is thus possible to rank 
the donors according to this index of aid selectivity (Table 3).  
 
The ranking thus obtained is relatively close to that obtained from elasticities (Table 1). 
However, the ranking improves significantly for some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Spain and Germany, and obviously worsens for others, like Greece, New Zealand 
and Switzerland, as well as IDA and IMF, who nevertheless preserve a good ranking 
(respectively 9th and 13th). These differences in results reinforce the doubts previously 
expressed about the elasticity method.17 
 
From the same Table 3, one can clearly see the preferred criteria of each donor. For example, 
compared to the whole set of donors, the World Bank (through IDA) and the IMF18 support—
by virtue of their mandate—the low-income countries. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
World Bank considers “good governance” to be an important criterion, which is less the case 
of the IMF, even less the case of the United Nations. Among bilateral donors, Japan, 
Denmark, Spain and Luxembourg are the most attached to governance. France focuses more 
on the level of poverty—measured by the per capita GDP—and on the level of human capital 
(HAI) than on governance or vulnerability, while the European Commission, and even more 
the United States, do not seem to be very sensitive to any of the four criteria.   
                                                          
17
 Cf. note 14 above. 
18
 Here are only considered the Structural Adjustment Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 
and the Facility for Growth and Poverty Reduction. 
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b. Taking specific donor preferences into account  
 
We previously underlined that assessing selectivity should take into account the fact that 
bilateral donors may logically have preferences for certain countries, mainly due to historical 
or cultural ties or because they feel that they have a special responsibility with regard to post-
conflict countries. We thus consider the possibility of a preference given — in a proportion 
fixed arbitrarily at 20% — by donors to countries that share their language. This can be 
justified by the donors’ strategy of defending a minority language by promoting the economic 
development of the countries speaking this language considered as an international public 
good. This leads us to identify from among the aid recipients those using the Spanish, 
Portuguese or French language. However, we do not consider that the United Kingdom, 
Ireland or the United States could share the same concern of defending the use of English. We 
alternatively consider that the former colonial powers (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom) may understandably give relatively more aid to their 
former colonies (in the same proportion of 20%). Finally and again independently, we 
adjusted the profile of the aid recipients to take account (in the same proportion of 20%) of a 
possible post-conflict situation.19 
 
The construction of the indicator adjusted for the three kinds of preference consisted in 
multiplying by 1.2 each of the four elements (wij * GDPi ; wij * HAIi ; wij * EVIi ; wij * KKIi) 
when the donor i allocates aid to a receiver j which has the chosen characteristic. The 
adjustment was done independently for each kind of preference20. The preference given to the 
countries in a post conflict situation was taken into account without any distinction between 
the donors. This adjustment improves the ranking of the countries likely to have specific 
preferences all the more since they are selective with regard to other criteria in allocating their 
aid to countries sharing the same language or to former colonies. In other words it is not an 
additional criterion, but an adjustment or multiplicative factor acting through the other 
criteria. 
                                                          
19
 Unlike cultural preferences, which concern only bilateral donors, preference for post-conflict countries may 
also concern multilateral donors. Cf. Annex 2 for a definition of post-conflict countries. 
20
 For the linguistic preference the selectivity index has been adjusted to take into account the three following 
elements: 
1. France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland disburse ODA towards countries with 
more than 33% of children enrolled in French-speaking schools.   
2. Spain disburses aid towards countries with Spanish as official language. 
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Not surprisingly, the new ranking shows the former colonial powers—particularly Portugal, 
the United Kingdom and France—in a better position. A similar increase in the ranking occurs 
when linguistic preference is taken into account. Thus, Portugal, which gives a priority to 
Portuguese-speaking countries, France, Belgium and Canada (but not Switzerland), which 
give some preference to French-speaking countries, and Spain have a better ranking (Table 
4).21 The adjustment carried out in Table 5 for the countries in a post-conflict situation also 
modifies the ranking, which mainly improves the position of Belgium, Finland and Sweden, 
and lowers the position of IDA and IMF. But as indicated in Table 2 the impact of any of 
these three adjustments on ranking is rather limited compared to other changes in the main 
criteria of selectivity22.  
 
The paper did not aim at analysing the quantitative implications for the receivers of the 
adoption of new allocation criteria compared to the canonical ones. Such an exercise is made 
difficult due to the lack of data on the CPIA. Moreover, selectivity criteria cannot be used to 
determine a new allocation pattern without a general model of allocation. However, a 
potential change in effective allocation can be noted as an illustration, referring to Dollar and 
Levin’s work on “forgotten States” (2005), which uses the CPIA. These authors defined a 
category of states named “Difficult Partnership Countries (DPC)”, which are low-income 
countries and have weak institutions (low CPIA),23 and find that they receive on average less 
aid than the other developing countries (even with regard to their CPIA): on average US$ 40 
per capita versus 94. If we look at the HAI and EVI average levels of these 29 DPCs, it turns 
out that they have a lower human capital (HAI equals 40 versus 70) and a higher vulnerability 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3. Portugal disburses aid towards countries with Portuguese as official language. 
21
 The results for “average profile of recipient countries adjusted for the preference given to former colonies”   
are not presented here as they are rather similar to those relative to language sharing. They are available on 
request. 
22
 We have also tested the sensitivity of the results by using an adjustment coefficient of 1.1 instead of 1.2.  
Following the adjustment for former colonies or linguistic preferences, Portugal stays at the first rank (versus 7th 
rank without adjustment) among bilateral donors, Belgium is now to the 5th and 6th ranks instead of 4th with 1.2 
adjustment (versus 5th without adjustment). France is at the 10th and 11th ranks instead of 7th (versus 13th without 
adjustment), United Kingdom, for the former colonies adjustment, is  now at the 4th rank instead of the 3rd 
(versus 8th rank without adjustment). These results show that even a small adjustment coefficient may change 
significantly the ranking of the donors.    
 
23
 The authors use two bottom quintiles of World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to 
proxy for this concept. 
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(EVI equals 46 versus 38)24. The adoption of the new criteria (HAI and EVI), as proposed in 
our paper, would meet the authors concern about a low allocation of aid to these countries.      
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First the definition of an optimal 
allocation of development aid, whatever the donors, raises some problems which have not 
been appropriately addressed in the literature. Still needed for the international donor 
community is to agree on satisfactory criteria for aid allocation. Several different criteria have 
to be used given the complex relationships between development aid, growth  and poverty 
reduction, as underlined by the academic literature. It seems, however, that an agreement 
should be easily reached on the four criteria that we have used: two poverty-related criteria 
(per capita income and the level of human capital) and two criteria corresponding to the likely 
factors of aid effectiveness (governance and economic vulnerability). Agreement on the 
criteria not yet adopted by the canonical vision of aid selectivity (human capital and 
vulnerability) could be facilitated by the existence of the two indicators used by the United 
Nations for the identification of the Least Developed Countries (HAI and EVI). As also 
shown, the use of these criteria may change donors’ effective allocation of aid. It is all the 
more important to acknowledge the legitimacy of using a diversity of criteria that in the 
Global Monitoring Report, the World Bank and the IMF used recipient countries’ CPIA as the 
main criterion to assess donors’ selectivity, thus intending to influence the donors’ behaviour. 
This influence depends on the importance that donors attach to this assessment from a 
political point of view.   
 
Second, based on this analysis, it seems debatable to apply uniform criteria in order to assess 
the selectivity of the various bilateral sources of aid, since donors legitimately have particular 
preferences due to specific solidarities, and a comparative advantage in assistance to certain 
countries. Moreover, a donor’s selectivity can logically aim at compensating for different 
selectivity preferences of other donors. If one thus wants to compare the aid selectivity of 
developed countries, it may be advisable to seek a consensus on how to take into account 
particular, but legitimate preferences of some bilateral donors, at the same time as one applies 
common criteria. We have outlined a way of doing this in the last section of this paper. 
 
                                                          
24
 Cf. Annex 2, Table 2. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.16 
 22 
Thirdly the debate about criteria has an implication  on the optimal allocation of total aid. The 
scientific issue still to be addressed is the design of a model that will make it possible to 
determine an optimal aid allocation using multiple criteria. Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) 
have proposed a model of optimal allocation, with the objective to maximize the reduction of 
the number of poor by 2015. Aid is expected to contribute to this goal through its effect on 
growth, according to an income elasticity of poverty assumed to be the same across countries. 
Collier and Dollar assume that the positive effect of aid on growth depends on the quality of 
the economic policy and institutions (measured by the CPIA). They then design a linear 
program which enables an optimal aid allocation between the various countries to be 
calculated on the basis of the current level of total aid. This model is relatively simple insofar 
as it is based on a clear objective (maximum reduction of the number of poor) and, also, 
allocation is based on only two criteria (the initial level of monetary poverty and the quality of 
economic policy expected to impact aid growth effectiveness ). The principle of simulation is 
then to equalise across recipient countries the marginal contribution of aid to reducing the 
number of poor. This model, however, does not allow the structural handicaps of the recipient 
countries to be taken into account simultaneously. Vulnerability could be introduced into this 
model as it increases aid effectiveness by promoting growth (as good economic policy), but it 
is not the same for the weakness of human capital. In order that aid be allocated according to 
both the structural handicaps to be offset and the characteristics of recipient countries which 
condition aid effectiveness, it would be advisable to design a model based on an objective and 
an aid-growth relationship other than those of Collier and Dollar. This is what we propose to 
do in a future work.25 It would then be possible to compare the impact on aid allocation of the 
new criteria proposed to that of the canonical model.  
  
Once a desirable allocation of total development aid has been determined, each international 
institution and each bilateral donor would have the responsibility of indicating the share of aid 
which each recipient country that it wishes to finance should ideally receive. This should be 
done with each donor country clearly stating its own criteria of selectivity. The share 
attributed to each donor should be negotiated with all the other donors, in order to explicitly 
take into account the donors’ interdependence in global aid allocation. One could consider 
                                                          
25
 Two other studies have dealt with global aid selectivity: Cogneau and Naudet (2004) and Llavador and 
Roemer (2001) have attempted to apply the principle of social equity by allocating aid to countries whose 
structural growth handicaps most undermine the utility provided by an effort or a similar quality of economic 
policy. These two studies however adopt Collier and Dollar’s main idea of aid effectiveness depending on 
economic policy. 
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that the international institutions have the responsibility to give aid in priority to those 
countries for which the normal quota of total assistance had not been spontaneously covered 
by the bilateral donors. This procedure would have the advantage of allowing a better foresee 
ability of aid flows for each recipient and less donor fragmentation in each of the countries. 
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Graphs and Tables 
 
Graph 1 
Distribution of DAC donors’ aid according to CPIA   
Aid per bilateral donor country’s capita to low-income countries,  average for 1999-2002 ($ per capita)    
 
Source: GMR, 2004 
 
 
Graph 2 
Preferential Distribution of DAC donors’ aid to LDCs   
Source: DAC and CERDI’s estimates. 
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Table 1 
Selectivity according to elasticities estimated by an allocation model 
42 bilateral and multilateral donors, 2003 
 
 Selectivity focusing  Selectivity focusing  Selectivity focusing  Global model 
 on MDGs  on vulnerability  on governance   
 
 Difference   Difference   Difference   Difference Rank  
 Rank (1) w/ Dollar   Rank (1) w/ Dollar   Rank (1) w/ Dollar   Rank (1) w/ Dollar  within the  
  & Levin   & Levin   & Levin   & Levin 22 bilateral donors 
22 bilateral donors            
Australia 34 -9  23 2  14 11  24 1 7 
Austria 30 -20  37 -27  35 -25  39 -29 19 
Belgium 4 9  22 -9  36 -23  23 -10 6 
Canada 21 2  33 -10  26 -3  25 -2 8 
Denmark 15 -13  24 -22  5 -3  16 -14 4 
Finland 28 -16  34 -22  19 -7  29 -17 12 
France 11 21  31 1  37 -5  30 2 13 
Germany 27 -7  41 -21  27 -7  41 -21 21 
Greece 41 -5  25 11  38 -2  32 4 14 
Ireland 5 14  13 6  23 -4  11 8 2 
Italy 22 5  30 -3  40 -13  36 -9 16 
Japan 39 -17  40 -18  18 4  40 -18 20 
Luxembourg 17 1  14 4  28 -10  12 6 3 
Netherlands 16 -9  29 -22  11 -4  28 -21 11 
New Zealand 33 -3  15 15  32 -2  20 10 5 
Norway 18 -10  26 -18  15 -7  27 -19 10 
Portugal 8 23  4 27  41 -10  6 25 1 
Spain 31 11  42 0  39 3  42 0 22 
Sweden 25 -20  27 -22  22 -17  33 -28 15 
Switzerland 20 1  32 -11  21 0  26 -5 9 
United Kingdom 32 -28  36 -32  12 -8  38 -34 18 
United States 29 -5  38 -14  20 4  37 -13 17 
           
(1) Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
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Table 1 cont’d 
 
 Selectivity focusing  Selectivity focusing  Selectivity focusing  Global model 
 on MDGs  On vulnerability  on governance   
 
 Difference   Difference   Difference   Difference Rank 
 Rank (1) w/ Dollar   Rank (1) w/ Dollar   Rank (1)  w/ Dollar   Rank (1) w/ Dollar  within the  
  & Levin   & Levin   & Levin   & Levin 20 multilateral  
donors 
20 multilateral donors             
AfDF 1 8  1 8  4 5  1 8 1 
Arab Agencies 7 10  6 11  2 15  2 15 2 
AsDF 42 -8  11 23  16 18  18 16 14 
CarDB 36 -10  5 21  33 -7  8 18 7 
EBRD 40 -12  8 20  29 -1  10 18 9 
EC 19 -3  19 -3  13 3  17 -1 13 
GEF 38 -24  39 -25  25 -11  34 -20 19 
IDA 3 -2  2 -1  1 0  3 -2 3 
IDB Sp.Fund 37 0  18 19  42 -5  22 15 17 
IFAD 13 -2  12 -1  3 8  5 6 5 
Nordic Dev.Fund 26 -20  7 -1  7 -1  9 -3 8 
Other UN 14 19  28 5  34 -1  31 2 18 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF) 6 -3  3 0  8 -5  4 -1 4 
UNDP 12 17  16 13  9 20  14 15 11 
UNFPA 10 29  21 18  10 29  19 20 15 
UNHCR 24 17  35 6  31 10  35 6 20 
UNICEF 9 29  20 18  17 21  21 17 16 
UNRWA 35 5  9 31  30 10  13 27 10 
UNTA 23 12  17 18  24 11  15 20 12 
WFP 2 13  10 5  6 9  7 8 6 
Average of Absolute value of 
difference (42 donors) = 
11.7   13.4   8.6   12.7  
 
(1) Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.16 
 30 
 
Table 2 
Summary impact of changing the measurement of aid selectivity: 
Average absolute value of  rank differences for 42 donors (multilateral & bilateral) and 
for only 22 bilateral donors or 20 multilateral donors, 2003 
 
 All 42donors Bilateral only 
between Dollar-Levin (2004) indices and other elasticity estimates :   
Income and other governance index (KKI) 8.7 3.8 
Income and vulnerability (EVI) 13.5 7.63 
Income and MDGs (HAI) 11.8 6.09 
Global model  12.8 7.27 
   
between index based on global allocation model estimates and recipient 
average profile index 
7.25 3.63 
   
between unadjusted recipient average profile index and index adjusted 
for: 
  
Former colonies  1.72 
Same language  2.27 
Post conflict  1.86 1.09 
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Table 3 
Average profile of recipient countries for each donor 
 
 Selectivity focusing  
On poverty 
Selectivity focusing  
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing  
on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing  
on governance 
Global model 
 Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (2) 
among Bil. 
22 bilateral donors            
Australia 21 4 30 -5 10 15 16 9 19 6 6 
Austria 40 -30 31 -21 36 -26 28 -18 37 -27 19 
Belgium 5 8 5 8 9 4 42 -29 18 -5 5 
Canada 28 -5 16 7 21 2 29 -6 24 -1 9 
Denmark 8 -6 14 -12 13 -11 8 -6 6 -4 2 
Finland 33 -21 20 -8 27 -15 14 -2 26 -14 11 
France 18 14 27 5 30 2 37 -5 29 3 13 
Germany 24 -4 32 -12 35 -15 22 -2 32 -12 16 
Greece 42 -6 41 -5 41 -5 43 -7 43 -7 22 
Ireland 7 12 3 16 6 13 18 1 3 16 1 
Italy 32 -5 24 3 26 1 41 -14 35 -8 18 
Japan 25 -3 38 -16 39 -17 5 17 34 -12 17 
Luxembourg 16 2 25 -7 8 10 10 8 8 10 4 
Netherlands 20 -13 19 -12 24 -17 26 -19 22 -15 7 
New Zealand 41 -11 36 -6 12 18 40 -10 39 -9 20 
Norway 35 -27 15 -7 23 -15 31 -23 27 -19 12 
Portugal 34 -3 9 22 2 29 33 -2 7 24 3 
Spain 31 11 35 7 29 13 9 33 31 11 15 
Sweden 27 -22 21 -16 22 -17 25 -20 25 -20 10 
Switzerland 30 -9 28 -7 33 -12 24 -3 30 -9 14 
United Kingdom 17 -13 17 -13 32 -28 21 -17 23 -19 8 
United States 39 -15 33 -9 37 -13 38 -14 41 -17 21 
(1) Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
(2)   Rank within the 22 bilateral donors 
D&L: Dollar and Levine, 2004 
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Table 3 cont’d  
 
 Selectivity focusing  
On poverty 
Selectivity focusing 
 on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing  
on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing  
on governance 
Global model 
 Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (3)  
among Bil. 
20 multilateral donors            
AfDF 1 8 2 7 3 6 7 2 1 8 1 
Arab Agencies 12 5 7 10 7 10 13 4 4 13 3 
AsDF 11 23 29 5 19 15 11 23 17 17 13 
CarDB 29 -3 43 -17 1 25 1 25 20 6 14 
EBRD 36 -8 42 -14 43 -15 39 -11 42 -14 20 
EC 37 -21 23 -7 25 -9 23 -7 28 -12 16 
GEF 23 -9 39 -25 38 -24 3 11 33 -19 17 
IDA 4 -3 18 -17 28 -27 15 -14 9 -8 5 
IDB Sp.Fund 10 27 34 3 4 33 6 31 14 23 10 
IFAD 6 5 22 -11 18 -7 12 -1 10 1 6 
Nordic Dev.Fund 2 4 10 -4 5 1 4 2 2 4 2 
Other UN 38 -5 37 -4 31 2 32 1 36 -3 18 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF) 3 0 12 -9 34 -31 30 -27 13 -10 9 
UNDP 13 16 8 21 17 12 27 2 11 18 7 
UNFPA 14 25 13 26 16 23 20 19 12 27 8 
UNHCR 15 26 11 30 20 21 35 6 16 25 12 
UNICEF 19 19 6 32 15 23 36 2 15 23 11 
UNRWA 43 -3 1 39 40 0 17 23 38 2 19 
UNTA 26 9 26 9 14 21 19 16 21 14 15 
WFP 9 6 4 11 11 4 34 -19 5 10 4 
            
 
(1) Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
(3)  Rank within the 20 multilateral donors 
 D&L: Dollar and Levine, 2004 
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 33 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Average profile of recipient countries for each bilateral donor, adjusted for linguistic preference26 
 
 Selectivity focusing 
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing 
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing 
on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing 
on governance 
Global model 
 Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
22 bilateral 
donors 
          
Australia 9 7 15 1 5 11 7 9 8 8 
Austria 19 -13 16 -10 19 -13 15 -9 19 -13 
Belgium 1 7 1 7 2 6 21 -13 4 4 
Canada 11 3 4 10 8 6 12 2 6 8 
Denmark 5 -4 5 -4 7 -6 5 -4 5 -4 
Finland 17 -10 11 -4 15 -8 6 1 13 -6 
France 3 17 9 11 13 7 17 3 7 13 
Germany 12 -1 17 -6 18 -7 11 0 16 -5 
Greece 21 0 22 -1 22 -1 22 -1 22 -1 
Ireland 4 6 2 8 4 6 9 1 2 8 
Italy 16 1 13 4 14 3 20 -3 18 -1 
Japan 13 0 21 -8 21 -8 4 9 17 -4 
Luxembourg 2 7 7 2 3 6 3 6 3 6 
Netherlands 8 -4 10 -6 12 -8 14 -10 10 -6 
New Zealand 20 -2 20 -2 6 12 19 -1 20 -2 
Norway 18 -13 6 -1 11 -6 16 -11 15 -10 
Portugal 6 13 3 16 1 18 2 17 1 18 
Spain 10 12 19 3 9 13 1 21 9 13 
Sweden 15 -12 12 -9 10 -7 13 -10 12 -9 
Switzerland 14 -2 14 -2 16 -4 8 4 14 -2 
United Kingdom 7 -5 8 -6 17 -15 10 -8 11 -9 
United States 22 -7 18 -3 20 -5 18 -3 21 -6 
 
 
                                                          
26
 The four indicators are multiplied by 1.2 when: 
1. France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland disburse ODA towards countries with 
more than 33% of the children are enrolled in French-speaking schools.   
2. Spain disburses aid towards countries with Spanish as official language. 
3. Portugal disburses aid towards countries with Portuguese as official language. 
D&L: Dollar and Levine, 2004. 
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Table 5 
Average profile of recipient countries for each donor, adjusted for post conflict countries 
 
 Selectivity focusing  
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing  
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing  
On vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing 
 on governance 
Global model 
 Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (2) 
among Bil. 
22 bilateral donors            
Australia 21 4 31 -6 11 14 22 3 24 1 10 
Austria 40 -30 30 -20 36 -26 20 -10 36 -26 19 
Belgium 1 12 4 9 4 9 42 -29 8 5 4 
Canada 27 -4 15 8 18 5 28 -5 22 1 9 
Denmark 9 -7 17 -15 13 -11 9 -7 6 -4 2 
Finland 31 -19 16 -4 26 -14 4 8 19 -7 6 
France 17 15 27 5 30 2 39 -7 30 2 14 
Germany 23 -3 32 -12 35 -15 25 -5 31 -11 15 
Greece 42 -6 41 -5 41 -5 43 -7 43 -7 22 
Ireland 6 13 3 16 5 14 12 7 2 17 1 
Italy 29 -2 20 7 25 2 41 -14 33 -6 17 
Japan 26 -4 38 -16 39 -17 7 15 35 -13 18 
Luxembourg 16 2 25 -7 9 9 6 12 10 8 5 
Netherlands 20 -13 21 -14 24 -17 29 -22 21 -14 8 
New Zealand 41 -11 36 -6 12 18 40 -10 38 -8 20 
Norway 34 -26 14 -6 23 -15 27 -19 26 -18 12 
Portugal 32 -1 9 22 2 29 30 1 7 24 3 
Spain 35 7 35 7 29 13 10 32 32 10 16 
Sweden 22 -17 18 -13 21 -16 21 -16 20 -15 7 
Switzerland 30 -9 28 -7 33 -12 18 3 29 -8 13 
United Kingdom 18 -14 19 -15 31 -27 24 -20 25 -21 11 
United States 39 -15 33 -9 37 -13 38 -14 39 -15 21 
(1) Rank within the 42 bilateral and multilateral donors  
(2) Rank within the 22 bilateral donors 
                   D & L: Dollar and Levin, 2004.                        
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                                                                                               Table 5 Cont’d 
 
 Selectivity focusing  
on poverty 
Selectivity focusing  
on MDGs  
Selectivity focusing 
 on vulnerability 
Selectivity focusing 
 on governance 
Global model 
 Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (1) Diff. With 
D&L 
Rank (3) 
among Bil. 
20 multilateral donors            
AfDF 2 7 2 7 3 6 11 -2 1 8 1 
Arab Agencies 11 6 7 10 8 9 13 4 4 13 3 
AsDF 13 21 29 5 19 15 14 20 18 16 13 
CarDB 33 -7 43 -17 1 25 1 25 27 -1 15 
EBRD 36 -8 42 -14 43 -15 37 -9 42 -14 20 
EC 37 -21 23 -7 27 -11 19 -3 28 -12 16 
GEF 24 -10 39 -25 38 -24 3 11 34 -20 17 
IDA 5 -4 22 -21 28 -27 17 -16 13 -12 8 
IDB Sp.Fund 10 27 34 3 6 31 8 29 16 21 11 
IFAD 7 4 24 -13 22 -11 15 -4 12 -1 7 
Nordic Dev.Fund 3 3 11 -5 7 -1 2 4 3 3 2 
Other UN 38 -5 37 -4 32 1 35 -2 37 -4 18 
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF) 4 -1 13 -10 34 -31 33 -30 17 -14 12 
UNDP 12 17 8 21 17 12 31 -2 11 18 6 
UNFPA 14 25 12 27 16 23 16 23 9 30 5 
UNHCR 15 26 10 31 20 21 34 7 15 26 10 
UNICEF 19 19 6 32 14 24 36 2 14 24 9 
UNRWA 43 -3 1 39 40 0 26 14 40 0 19 
UNTA 28 7 26 9 15 20 23 12 23 12 14 
WFP 8 7 5 10 10 5 32 -17 5 10 4 
            
(3)  Rank within the 20 multilateral donors 
 
The four indicators are multiplied by 1.2 for disbursements to post-conflict countries (Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo Dem. 
Rep., Croatia, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan). 
D & L: Dollar and Levin, 2004. 
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Annex 1 
 
Acronyms 
 
 
 
 
 
AfDF  African Development Fund (African Development Bank) 
AsDF  Asian Development Fund 
CarDB  Caribbean Development Bank 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
EC  European Commission 
GEF  Global Environment Facility 
IDA  International Development Association 
IDB Fund Inter American Development Fund 
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development 
SAF  Structural Adjustment Facility 
ESAF  Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility  
PRGF  Poverty Reduction & Growth Facility  
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program  
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities  
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for refugees  
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
UNTA  United Nations Regular Program of Technical Assistance  
WFP  World Food Program 
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Annex 2 
 
 
Our definition of post-conflict countries is based on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 
(2002 & 2004). A country is labeled post-conflict during the first four years after cessation of 
conflict. As in Dollar and Levine (2005), we focused on large conflicts, recognized by donors as 
requiring additional assistance. We therefore constrained the sample of pos-conflict countries to 
those which had UN peacekeeping operations around the time of the conflict’s cessation.   
 
The end date of a conflict was based on Collier and Hoeffler (2002) if available, or on Sambanis 
(2000) if not. Since both of the conflict databases end in 1999, for 2000-2002 we used the data on 
reached agreements for end of conflict from UN missions’ background data. If a country reverted 
to conflict within the four years after the end of a previous conflict, the post-conflict status ended 
in the year of conflict resumption.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
List of post-conflict countries 
 
Recipient countries  Post confl. Years UN Missions End of conflict
Afghanistan 2002 UNAMA March 2002
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-1999 UNMIBH November 1995
Cambodia 1992-1995 UNAMIC October 1991
Central African Rep. 1997-2000 MINURCA January 1997
Congo Dem.Rep. (Zaire) 2000-2002 MONUC September 1999
Croatia 1995-1998 UNCRO December 1994
El Salvador 1992-1995 ONUSAL January 1992
Georgia 1994-1997 UNOMIG December 1993
Guatemala 1997-2000 MINUGUA December 1996
Haitia 1994-1995 UNMIH September 1993
Mozambique 1993-1996 ONUMOZ October 1992
Namibia 1992 UNTAG December 1988
Rwanda 1995-1998 UNAMIR July 1994
Serbia & Montenegro 1995-1998 UNPROFOR December 1994
Sierra Leone 2000-2002 UNAMSIL July 1999
Somalia 1992-1993 UNOSOM I April 1992
Tajikistan 1995-1998 UNMOT December 1994
Timor oriental  2000-2002 UNMISET August 1999
 
a The normal four-year post-conflict period in these countries was cut short due to resumption of conflict.   
Sources: Dollar and Levin 2005, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004, Sambanis 2000, UN DPKO websites. 
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Table 2 
Comparison of DCP vs. non DCP countries 
 
 Aid per capita  
US$ 
HAI EVI 
 
   
Non DCP countries (137 countries)     
Average 94,4 69,7 37,6 
Standard error 239,8 18,3 11,5 
    
DCP countries (29 countries)     
Average 40,6 40,2 45,9 
Standard error 52,8 17,1 7,7 
Source: calculation of the authors 
 
